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CONFLICT OF LAW REGARDING REVOCATION OF 
WILLS: MUTINY ON THE SITUS DEFAULT 
JOHN P. GASET?
“ ‘The land taboo’—what an excellent phrase to describe that curious doctrine, so popular 
with English and American commentators, that every conceivable question affecting the 
transfer of title to land must invariably be determined by the domestic law of the situs.”   
– Professor Moffatt Hancock1   
Abstract 
It is commonplace in our contemporary society for a testator to own realty situated 
beyond domiciliary borders. Spliced with the traditional choice-of-law baseline—that the 
law of the situs is used to determine conflicts concerning interests in realty—such a testator 
is presented with undue revocation complexities. This Note explores those complications, 
and suggests that they are unnecessarily imposed. They threaten testamentary expectation 
and fail to further the interests purportedly justifying their existence. As such, this Note 
argues that a more functional baseline should be employed in lieu of the rigid application of 
common law currently utilized. By removing situs law application as the default in 
revocation proceedings, a functional approach alleviates expectation concerns, lowers 
transaction costs, and leaves legitimate state interests unscathed.    
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I. INTRODUCTION: FRAMING THE REVOCATION ISSUE
 The administration of a will disposing of realty dispersed 
throughout the nation invokes two distinctly correlated issues: 
validation and revocation. A will operates as a conveyance or transfer 
of realty,2 but only the state in which property is situated—the 
situs—has jurisdiction to devolve real property.3 Accordingly, a will 
devolving realty necessitates ancillary proceedings in each state real 
property is located, and “the courts in each state will construe it as to 
the lands located therein as if devised by separate wills.”4 To the 
extent the laws of each state differ, the express intentions of the 
testator—either in execution or revocation5—may not come to 
fruition.6 However, current statutory design has unnecessarily 
deemed expressions of revocation the greater threat to conscious  
estate apportionment. 
 At common law, the validity of a testamentary instrument 
disposing of immovables7 was determined by the law of the situs;8
however, the validity of a will of movables was determined by 
 2.  PETER HAY, ET. AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 1294 (5th ed. 2010).  
 3.  1 JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE & MULTINATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING
§14.02 (3d ed. 2006); see also Estate of Lampert v. Estate of Lampert, 896 P.2d 214, 220 
(Alaska 1995) (“[M]atters pertaining to the validity of conveyances of real property are 
governed by the law of the situs of the property.”).   
Any state in which a decedent was domiciled or owned property at the time of his 
death may probate the decedent’s will. See, e.g., Biederman v. Cheatham (In re Estate of 
Biederman), 161 So. 2d 538, 541-42 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964). However, this jurisdiction is “not 
necessarily exclusive.” Cuevas v. Kelly, 873 So. 2d 367, 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); see also
Robert M. Bozeman, The Conflict of Laws Relating to Wills, Probate Decrees and Estates,
49 A.B.A. J. 670 (1963). “The courts of a decedent’s domicile do not have jurisdiction to 
control devolution of real property held in another state . . . .” Stein v. Welch (In re Estate 
of Stein), 896 P.2d 740, 745 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); see also Phillips v. Phillips, 104 So. 234, 
236 (Ala. 1925) (stating that it is the situs’ “right” to govern wills of its lands). The situs 
“state alone has final authority to determine title to [its] property.” SCHOENBLUM, supra,
at 14-6.  
 4.  Trotter v. Van Pelt, 198 So. 215, 217 (Fla. 1940); see also In re Estate of Stein, 896 
P.2d at 745 (“The probate of a nonresident’s will who dies leaving property within the state 
affects only the property within the jurisdiction and has no effect on the validity of the will 
itself beyond the limited purpose of the plenary power possessed by the state with respect 
to property within its domain . . . .”).  
 5.  Both execution and revocation are “equally significant” expressions of the 
testator’s intention. See HAY, supra note 2, at 1305. 
 6.  See, e.g., First Presbyterian Church of Sterling, Ill. v. Hodge (In re Barrie’s 
Estate), 35 N.W.2d 658 (Iowa 1949).    
 7.  In choice-of-law idiom, personal property is referred to as “movable[],” whereas 
real property is referred to as “immovable[].” See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 9, topic 2, intro. note (1971); id. § 263. For a discussion on the 
history and reasons for such classifications, see George W. Stumberg, Testamentary 
Dispositions and the Conflict of Laws, 34 TEX. L. REV. 28, 30-33 (1955). 
 8.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 239; see also Estate of 
Lampert, 896 P.2d at 220.  
2012] CONFLICT OF LAW REGARDING REVOCATION OF WILLS 1107
reference to the law of the decedent’s domicile at the time of death.9
To the testator owning realty situated outside the domiciliary 
jurisdiction, strict adherence to these traditional rules yielded harsh 
outcomes. If the formal requirements of the situs and domiciliary 
differed only slightly, dispositions of real property unnecessarily 
failed. Moreover, severity was not limited to results: strict adherence 
was also a “source of inconvenience” that forced compliance with the 
requirements of devising land in several states.10 Both considerations 
prompted almost universal statutory modification away from the 
common law.11 A variety of adjustments have been utilized,12 but 
situs states will now generally validate a foreign will if executed in a 
manner compliant with “the law at the time of execution of the  
place where the will [was] executed, or of the law of the place  
where at the time of execution or at the time of death the testator  
[was] domiciled.”13
 As the same common law principles that govern execution also 
apply to revocation,14 deviation from traditional choice-of-law notions 
is similarly warranted. Analogous to differing execution 
requirements, differing revocation laws may affect the intended 
consequences of actions or events occurring in the non-situs 
jurisdiction.15 However, while alleviating execution concerns,16
modern validation statutes have proven ineffective in shielding 
issues of revocation from the potentially harsh outcomes or 
inconveniences of the common law.17 Though some validation 
 9.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 263; see also Stumberg, supra
note 7, at 28. As discussed infra in Part III.A.ii., the modern-day justifications for the 
bifurcation of movables and immovables are probative of situs default abandonment. 
 10.  HAY, supra note 2, at 1294-95; see also SCHOENBLUM, supra note 3, at 14-4.        
 11.  Indeed, “[t]he motivation for looking beyond situs law has been the sensible 
attitude that a testator should not be required, each time he acquires real property in 
another foreign jurisdiction, to execute a will in order to comply with minor technical 
formalities of the situs’ wills law.” SCHOENBLUM, supra note 3, at 14-4; see also HAY, supra
note 2, at 1294-95.  
 12.  For an illustration of the various validation statutes adopted, see SCHOENBLUM,
supra note 3, at 14-4 to -7.    
 13.  UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-506 (1969). But see FLA. STAT. § 732.502(2) (2011) (not 
including state of domicile at death). Obviously, a will is also valid if executed in 
conformity with the laws of the situs.   
 14.  SCHOENBLUM, supra note 3, at 14-25.        
 15.  It is important to note that only the differences between positions on partial 
revocation, or differences in the events constituting a revocation by operation of law will 
significantly burden the revoking testator—not revocation by superseding will.   
 16.  Indeed, historical differences in formal will requirements “have largely been 
removed by the adoption of uniform statutes . . . recognizing the validity of wills executed 
elsewhere.” HAY, supra note 2, at 1302. The effect has been to decrease the likelihood of 
formal invalidation nationwide. Id.; see also SCHOENBLUM, supra note 3, at 14-9 (“[T]he 
number of jurisdictions looked to in establishing formal validity has in most states been 
increased, thus enhancing the likelihood that a will will be deemed valid.”).   
 17.  See SCHOENBLUM, supra note 3, at 14-26 (“State statutes that assume the formal 
validity of a will on the basis of compliance with the requirements of some other 
1108 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1105
statutes expressly deal with revocation, most refer only to 
execution.18 Even though there is a “clear link”19 between execution 
and revocation, the popular response to textual omission has been 
strict application of the common law.20 That is, the default position 
taken by situs states is to apply situs law to ancillary revocation 
determinations when real property is at issue, even if a valid 
revocation has occurred pursuant to the requirements or events 
requisite in the domiciliary or state of execution.21
 Repugnance from the situs default is grounded in its potential for 
objectionable outcomes. The default threatens to “upset[] the 
expectations of the testator and the policy of a sister state in giving 
effect to those expectations.”22 For instance, an act constituting a 
partial revocation in the domiciliary may fail to be the same under 
situs law. The situs may find the act ineffective to work a revocation 
or construe it to work a revocation in toto.23 Similarly, an event 
deemed a revocation by operation of law in the state the event 
occurred may not operate as such under situs law.24 In  
either situation, the testator’s expectations may be undermined.  
This possibility alone is good reason to abandon the situs  
default. Indeed, giving effect to the testator’s intentions is “of 
primary importance, the loadstar, cornerstone, [and] cardinal rule” of  
probate proceedings.25
 Some courts have managed to side-step inequitable outcomes by 
recognizing the commonsense correlation between execution and 
revocation.26 Others, by reframing the issue, have demonstrated a 
simple willingness to deviate from common law application when it 
                                                                                                                  
jurisdiction usually do not apply to revocations of wills.”). Moreover, the UPC has failed to 
provide relief. See id. at 14-29.           
 18.  Compare N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-5.1(b)(1) (McKinney 2011), with
ALA. CODE § 43-8-135 (1991). However, even statutes that reference revocation do so in an 
inappropriate way—essentially codifying the common law situs rule. See, e.g., N.Y. EST.
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-5.1(b)(1) (McKinney 2011).  
 19.  SCHOENBLUM, supra note 3, at 14-29.   
 20.  See, e.g., First Presbyterian Church of Sterling, Ill. v. Hodge (In re Barrie’s 
Estate), 35 N.W.2d 658 (Iowa 1949).     
 21.  See id. This is true even if the domicile has already determined that a revocation 
has occurred pursuant to domiciliary law. See id.; see also Thomas v. Taylor, No. C-000624, 
2001 WL 992086 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2001).  
 22.  Russell J. Weintraub, An Inquiry Into the Utility of “Situs” as a Concept in 
Conflicts Analysis, 52 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 28 (1966). 
 23.  Compare True v. Funk (In re Johannes’ Estate), 227 P.2d 148, 152 (Kan. 1951) 
(limiting obliteration statute to revocation in toto), with Mechler v. Luettgerodt (In re
Mechler’s Will), 16 N.W.2d 373, 379 (Wis. 1944) (“We concur in the conclusion of the trial 
court that the portion of the will through which lines have been drawn represent cancelled 
portions of the will and those bequests have been revoked.”).  
 24.  See, e.g., Thomas, 2001 WL 992086; Wimbush v. Wimbush (In re Estate of 
Wimbush), 587 P.2d 796, 797, 799 (Colo. App. 1978).  
 25.  In re Estate of Janney, 446 A.2d 1265, 1266 (Pa. 1982).  
 26.  See Note, Choice of Law in Estates and Trusts, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 354, 359 &  
n.36 (1969).  
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would work unjust results.27 The unfortunate exception: such “escape 
devices”28 are not largely accepted. Without express authority to the 
contrary, revocation matters are generally cloaked blindly with the 
formalism29 of the situs default.30   
 However, the argument for abandoning the situs default does not 
end at inequitable results as the potential for unintended 
consequences imposes undue transaction costs upon the revoking 
testator. At a minimum, the testator wishing to give teeth to 
expressions of revocation is forced to comply with the laws of each 
state in which real property is owned. Furthermore, as foreign 
probate decrees are not entitled to full faith and credit under the 
Federal Constitution,31 the situs default is “inefficient because it 
requires multiple litigation” and encourages fraud and abuse.32 Such 
extraneous litigation imposes undue transaction costs and may lead 
to conflicting results.33
 The gravamen against the situs default, however, is even more 
commonsensical: there is no reason for its existence. There is no 
reason for modern choice-of-law validation statutes not to 
accommodate revocation. Applying situs law to revocations—and only 
to revocations—is without logic and inconsistent in the face of 
acquiescence which modern validation statutes have established for 
equally significant formality requirements. As revocation is simply 
“the converse of execution,”34 the textualist approach commonly 
employed to interpret these statutes is unfounded: it is premised on 
“ancient distinction[s]”35 that no longer hold firm in a contemporary 
society of increased economy and mobility.36
 Moreover, the situs default fails to further the state interests 
purportedly justifying its existence. The primary purpose of 
 27.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Janney, 446 A.2d at 1266. 
 28.  Hancock, supra note 1, at 38.  
 29.  For a discussion on the role formalism plays in choice-of-law determinations, see 
Laura E. Little, Hairsplitting and Complexity in Conflict of Laws: The Paradox of 
Formalism, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 925 (2004).    
 30.  For an example, see Baird v. Larson (In re Estate of Swanson), 397 So. 2d 465 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1981), which “presents another example of blind application of situs law to a 
will contest.” Robby Alden, Modernizing the Situs Rule for Real Property Conflicts, 65 TEX.
L. REV. 585, 615-16 (1987).     
 31.  See infra cases accompanying notes 107, 113; see also Stein v. Welch (In re Estate 
of Stein), 896 P.2d 740, 745 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he state in which real property is 
located is not required to give full faith and credit to a decision of another state . . . .”); 
Recent Decisions, Conflict of Laws—Wills—Decision by Court of Domicile That Devise of 
Realty Had Been Revoked Held Not Binding Upon Jurisdiction Where Realty Located, 35 
VA. L. REV. 642, 642 (1949) [hereinafter Recent Decisions].  
 32.  Alden, supra note 30, at 607.     
 33.  Id. at 607-08.   
 34.  First Presbyterian Church of Sterling, Ill. v. Hodge (In re Barrie’s Estate), 35 
N.W.2d 658, 666 (Iowa 1949) (Smith, J., dissenting).   
 35.  Id. at 664 (Smith, J., dissenting).  
 36.  See id. at 667 (Smith, J., dissenting); see also Stumberg, supra note 7, at 29.  
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revocation formalities is to protect against fraud.37 However, the situs 
has a legitimate interest in protecting only its own citizens; 
protection for noncitizens is misplaced.38
 As a consequence, abandoning the situs default in revocation 
determinations is warranted. In its place, a more functional approach 
should be utilized. Instead of strict application of situs law, intent to 
revoke should be given effect if the testator has satisfied the formal 
requirements of the state most interested in the transaction.39
 Part II of this Note explores the burdens faced by a testator 
seeking to revoke a will of realty. Part III examines why these 
burdens are unnecessarily imposed. Lastly, Part IV suggests that a 
more functional approach would better serve as the default to  
revocation determinations.  
II. THE SITUS DEFAULT IMPOSES BURDENS UPON THE REVOKING 
TESTATOR AND ADMINISTRATION PROCESS
A.   The Situs Default Imposes Risk of Undermining the “Polestar” of 
Administration: Realizing the Expectations of the Testator 
 1.   The Meaning of Testamentary Expectations; Considerations of 
the Lay-Testator  
 It is well-established that the “paramount duty” of probate 
proceedings is to effectuate the intentions of the testator.40 Indeed, 
there is “no higher duty nor greater responsibility on the courts than 
that of seeing to it . . . that the will of the dead is honored. Knowledge 
in the living that this will be done affords a marked degree of solace 
and comfort in the afternoon and evening of life.”41 The situs default 
undermines the ability of a court to fulfill this obligation. Before 
exploring this effect, however, some discussion on what intentions 
are justifiably threatened is warranted.  
 With regard to the revoking testator, intentions are pragmatically 
linked to expectations. In order to ascertain intention, one must first 
determine the expected consequences of an act or event of revocation. 
The issues thus arise: how does one best ascertain the intentions of a 
testator revoking a will of realty situated outside domiciliary borders 
and how are such intentions best effectuated? Perhaps it is best to 
begin with the familiar adage that “[e]very one is presumed to know 
 37. See Weintraub, supra note 22, at 28-29. 
 38.  Id.
 39.  Note, supra note 26, at 359 (“[I]ntent to revoke should be given effect if the 
testator has satisfied the formal requirements of any state which is interested in the 
transaction.”); see generally Weintraub, supra note 22.   
 40.  Morgenthaler v. First Atl. Nat’l Bank of Daytona Beach, 80 So. 2d 446, 452  
(Fla. 1955).  
 41.  Id.
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the law affecting his acts.”42 Coupled with the situs default, however, 
this maxim assumes knowledge of multiple laws—those of the 
domiciliary or state of execution, as well as every state in which the 
testator owns realty. To the extent applicable laws differ, this 
assumes too much.  
 In the absence of extrinsic evidence, it is impossible to ascertain 
the consequences actually intended when an act or event has 
ambiguous results. Indeed, just as words often have differing 
meanings in different jurisdictions,43 so too can acts or events 
regarding revocation. For instance, not every state allows for partial 
revocation when a will is canceled, torn, or obliterated.44 Similarly, a 
will is revoked upon the testator’s subsequent marriage in most 
states, but not all.45 Therefore, by establishing a broad baseline from 
which to measure ambiguous acts or events, the situs default 
assumes that the testator intended potentially different consequences 
across jurisdictions. This may be the correct assumption, from time to 
time, but it surely cannot always be accurate.   
 The rules of testamentary construction have already dealt with 
the difficulties of establishing intent in the face of true ambiguity46 by 
establishing a narrow baseline: domiciliary law.47 That is, instead of 
assuming knowledge of every rule of construction potentially 
applicable to words, most courts construe a will under the 
“presumption that the maker of a will is more familiar with the law 
 42.  Succession of Robert, 2 Rob. 427, 431 (La. 1842); see also Royce v. Estate of Denby, 
379 A.2d 1256, 1258 (N.H. 1977) (acknowledging “the general presumption that a person is 
deemed to know and approve all dispositions and omissions in her will”).    
 43.  See, e.g., Easter v. Ochs, 837 S.W. 2d 516, 517-18 (Mo. 1992) (recognizing that the 
phrase “heirs of the body” may have differing meanings across jurisdictions).  
 44.  See infra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.    
 45.  See infra notes 77-78.  
 46.  As used herein, “true ambiguity” refers to a situation where a testator’s intent is 
“either non-existent, or, if he had an intention, it is unknown and unknowable.” RUSSELL J.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 327 (1971). Thus, a domiciliary 
baseline will only be applied “where there is no satisfactory evidence of the testator’s  
intentions.” Id.
 47.  See SCHOENBLUM, supra note 3, at 14-9 (“Even when the situs is determining the 
validity of a will disposing of personal property within its own borders, it will typically look 
to the law of the domicile at death.”); see also Santoli v. Louisville Trust Co., 550 S.W. 2d 
182, 183-84 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (“A testator is presumed to know the law of his domicile at 
the time of his death, and it is presumed that he wishes his will to be executed pursuant to 
that law if language or circumstances do not otherwise indicate.”); In re Estate of Pettit v. 
Levine, 657 S.W.2d 636, 643 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that “the testator's intent is 
governed by the law of the testator's domicile . . . whether it disposes of personalty or 
realty”); Hyman v. Glover (In re Estate of Hannan), 513 N.W.2d 339, 345 (Neb. Ct. App. 
1994) (stating that the “ ‘true intention of the testator’ ” is “ ‘shown by the will itself, in the 
light of attendant circumstances under which it was made,’ ” and “[t]he place where the 
decedent lived can be considered an attendant circumstance.”) (quoting Allemand v. 
Weaver, 305 N.W.2d 7, 9 (Neb. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 523 N.W.2d 672 (Neb. 1994). 
But see Ford v. Newman, 381 N.E.2d 392, 395-97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (applying situs rules  
of construction).  
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of his domicile than with the law of other jurisdictions and that the 
will is written with the law of his domicile in mind,”48 and “to apply 
any other law would be at great risk of defeating his intent.”49
 Fastening a similar baseline to revocation determinations is 
ostensibly more desirable than the wide berth of the situs default, 
but is still problematic. If we assume that a testator is most likely to 
be acquainted with domiciliary law, a domiciliary baseline is more 
persuasive than assuming the testator intended inconsistent 
consequences. Only “the domicile’s rule will be most likely to coincide 
with the actual intention of the testator,”50 and it would therefore be 
wise to “avoid the absurdity”51 of construing acts or events differently  
in each situs.  
 On the other hand, though “desirable and seem[ingly] correct, . . . 
the assumption that [a] testator actually knows the law [of his 
domiciliary] seems fictitious.”52 Especially from the perspective of a 
lay testator, it is “highly unrealistic . . . to assume that [a testator] 
formulated any intention in terms of his domicile’s rule . . . a rule of 
which he is probably unaware.”53 It is at this point the difference 
between intentions and expectations becomes problematic. Even if we 
assume that a testator intended for only domiciliary laws to apply, 
we cannot safely say that his expectations are destroyed by the 
application of a differing situs law. To the lay testator without 
sufficient knowledge to form accurate expectations, the application of 
either domiciliary or situs law could be equally inequitable.     
 It thus appears that hinging intention upon only those 
expectations justified in actual knowledge is too narrow to pass 
muster. If this is true, then it must be true that intention is also 
incapable of hinging upon the laws of several states. If we cannot 
assume knowledge of the domicile, how can we assume knowledge of 
the laws of each situs? To this end, one may argue that the situs 
default is justified on the basis of probabilities. That is, if 
expectations are based on inaccurate perceptions of the law, the 
application of differing laws may better ensure compliance with those 
expectations—realizing expectations, at least in part, is better than 
not at all. This may be true, but it seems to undermine the 
 48.  In re Estate of Pettit, 657 S.W.2d at 643.  
 49.  Chappell v. Chappell (In re Chappell’s Estate), 213 P. 684, 685 (Wash. 1923); see
also WEINTRAUB, supra note 46, at 328.   
 50.  WEINTRAUB, supra note 46, at 328.   
 51.  Id.; see also Ford, 381 N.E.2d at 398 (Craven, J., dissenting). 
 52.  4 PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 30.13 (William J. Bowe & Douglas H. Parker, eds., 
2004) (emphasis added).  
 53.  WEINTRAUB, supra note 46, at 328. Even a testator who employs the services of an 
attorney may be unaware of applicable law. See Baird v. Larson (In re Estate of Swanson), 
397 So. 2d 465, 468 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (acknowledging that “many people seeking legal 
advi[ce] or services may obtain that service free or at reduced cost from a relative or close 
friend who practices law in another state”).  
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“paramount duty”54 of ascertaining the testator’s true intentions. If 
we assume a testator actually has an expectation, then this rationale 
threatens to realize it only in part.55
 As a consequence, neither a single law nor a set of laws is well 
suited to serve as the baseline from which to interpret the revoking 
testator’s intention. Therefore, neither should be favored.56 Instead, 
the baseline “that should be applied is the law of the state 
predominantly concerned with the matters with which the issue of 
[revocation] deals.”57 This allows for a narrower baseline than the 
situs default, but sidesteps the problems inherent in assuming 
testator intent. Further, this approach generally fastens domiciliary 
law as the baseline for judging expectations. The interests of the 
situs will “rarely, if ever,”58 outweigh those of the domicile.  
 2.   Revocation by Physical Act 
 Every state allows for revocation in toto through a physical act of 
the testator,59 such as the canceling, tearing, obliterating, erasing, or 
cutting of a will. However, states are not uniform as to whether such 
acts may constitute a partial revocation.60 Some states allow for 
partial revocation,61 but many do not.62 In states that do not, acts 
 54.  Morgenthaler v. First Atl. Nat’l Bank of Daytona Beach, 80 So. 2d 446, 452  
(Fla. 1955).  
 55.  Moreover, the court’s ability to ascertain true intentions from the surrounding 
circumstances should not be overlooked. Sometimes it is simply clear what the testator 
wanted. See, e.g., In re Estate of Janney, 466 A.2d 1265, 1266 (Pa. 1982) (“In the instant 
case, it was her sister and her sister alone to whom the testatrix [intended to give].”).   
 56.  See WEINTRAUB, supra note 46, at 328.  
 57.  Id.
 58.  See Weintraub, supra note 22, at 16. But see In re Estate of Garver, 343 A.2d 817, 
819 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (concluding that even though the testator “was a New 
Jersey domiciliary at the time of his death . . . in the special circumstances of this case 
justice requires . . . refrain[ing] from applying the New Jersey law of revocation” and 
applying the law of the state in which the divorce occurred instead).       
 59. See generally Annotation, Effect of Testator’s Attempted Physical Alteration of Will 
After Execution, 24 A.L.R.2d 514, Part V (1952). 
 60.  See supra note 23. “[W]hether the physical alteration or mutilation of a part of a 
will operates to revoke the will in toto or only pro tanto is governed largely by the 
applicable statute, a partial revocation in most instances not being permissible unless the 
statute relates to revocation of the will, ‘or a part thereof,’ rather than just to revocation of 
the ‘will.’ ” Annotation, supra note 59, at 526.   
 61.  For example, Wisconsin allows for partial revocation. See Mechler v. Luettgerodt 
(In re Mechler’s Will), 16 N.W.2d 373, 379 (Wis. 1944) (“We concur in the conclusion of the 
trial court that the portion of the will through which lines have been drawn represent 
cancelled portions of the will and those bequests have been revoked.”). So does California, 
Campbell v. Noll (In re Estate of Cumming), 158 Cal. Rptr. 263 (Ct. App. 1979) (testator 
validly revoked bequest to mother by lining out mother’s name in executed will), and New 
Jersey, In re Danielly’s Estate, 81 A.2d 519, 520 (Camden County Ct. 1951) (“It is well 
established that portions of a will may be cancelled by obliterating said portions with 
pencil or other marks.”). The Uniform Probate Code also embraces partial revocation. 
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-507 cmt. (1969).   
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intended to be partial revocations will also be ineffective to revoke in
toto63 and thus fail to operate as revocatory at all.64 As such, differing 
laws may undermine the intentions of the testator.65
 In In re Barrie’s Estate,66 the decedent, though domiciled in Illinois 
at the time of her death, owned real property in Iowa. Upon her 
death, an instrument purporting to be her will was offered for 
probate in Illinois, but was rejected. “[T]he instrument had the word 
‘void’ written across its face in at least five places, including the 
attestation clause. Also, upon the cover and upon the envelope 
containing [the] same, appear[ed] the word ‘void’ written with the 
name ‘M. E. Barrie’ and ‘Mary E. Barrie.’ ”67 The Illinois court 
affirmatively found that such acts constituted a revocation in toto
under Illinois law and, therefore, that the decedent died intestate.68
The same instrument was later presented for probate in Iowa.69
Under Iowa law, however, such acts did not constitute a revocation.70
                                                                                                                  
 62.  For example, Kansas does not allow partial revocation by such acts. True v. Funk 
(In re Johannes’ Estate), 227 P.2d 148, 152 (Kan. 1951) (“We hold that under our statutes 
there can be no revocation of a part or parts of a will by burning, tearing, cancelling or 
obliterating such part or parts, with the effect that those portions become nullities and the 
remainder of the will stands.”).  
 63.  For example, in Oregon, “if a part of a will is burnt, torn, canceled, or obliterated 
by the testator . . . the act will be effective to revoke the will [in toto] if this was the 
intention of the testator . . . . But if the intent is only to revoke the mutilated portions of 
the will . . . the mutilations will be disregarded and the will as originally executed will be 
given effect.” Minsinger v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Portland (In re Estate of Minsinger), 364 P.2d 
615, 619 (Or. 1961). Colorado and Kansas also employ the same reasoning. See Scheer v. 
First Nat’l Bank of Denver (In re Estate of Haurin), 605 P.2d 65, 66-67 (Colo. App. 1979); 
In re Johannes’ Estate, 227 P.2d at 152.   
 64.  See, e.g., In re Johannes’ Estate, 227 P.2d at 152. For a will to be revoked in toto, it 
must have been the intent of the testator to do so. See id.; In re Estate of Minsinger, 364 
P.2d at 619. As such, acts done with the intent to partially revoke cannot meet the 
intention requirements of revocation in toto. See, e.g., Bd. of Nat’l Missions of the 
Presbyterian Church v. Sherry, 23 N.E.2d 730, 733 (Ill. 1939) (finding that cancellation of 
portions of will by testator with intent to revoke parts thereof cannot amount to revocation  
of entire will).         
 65.  As “[i]t is the intent with which the act is done that governs,” interstate 
differences of interpreting intention may also play a role in undermining expectations. In 
re Estate of Minsinger, 364 P.2d at 619; see also Presbyterian Church, 23 N.E.2d at 732. For 
a discussion on the various standards used for the determination of intent, see Annotation, 
supra note 59, Part III. Moreover, interstate differences in the application of the doctrine of 
dependent relative revocation may also be relevant to expectations. See id. at Part VIII.     
 66.  First Presbyterian Church of Sterling, Ill. v. Hodge (In re Barrie’s Estate), 35 
N.W.2d 658 (Iowa 1949).    
 67.  Id. at 660.  
 68.  Id.; see also In re Barrie’s Will, 65 N.E.2d 433, 438-39 (Ill.1946). 
 69.  In re Barrie’s Estate, 35 N.W.2d at 660. 
 70.  Compared to Illinois, canceling a will in Iowa requires conformity with more 
stringent formalities. Compare IOWA CODE § 633.284 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Legis. 
Sess.), with 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-7 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 97-671 of the 
2011 Reg. Sess.). Significantly, Iowa requires that for a valid revocation “by cancellation, 
the revocation must be witnessed in the same manner as the making of a new will.” IOWA
CODE ANN. § 633.284 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Legis. Sess.). Illinois, on the other 
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In holding that it was not bound by the judgment of the Illinois court, 
the Iowa court accepted the decedent’s will into probate and found it 
determinative as to the devolution of real property situated in Iowa.71
 The testatrix’s expectations were clearly undermined by the Iowa 
court. It is surely safe to assume that even a layperson expects the 
legal effect of a will to be altered, at least to some extent, by 
destroying or cancelling it.72 Nonetheless, Illinois had a greater stake 
in seeing its laws applied. Illinois law was “designed primarily for the 
benefit of Illinois citizens.”73 In contrast, “when the Iowa legislature 
decided to require more stringent probative safeguards for a valid 
revocation, it must have been concerned primarily with the protection 
of Iowa testators and beneficiaries.”74 Therefore, because it was 
primarily the interests of an Illinois testatrix being protected, Illinois 
law should have governed the efficacy of the attempted revocation.75
 3.   Revocation by Operation of Law  
 Certain events that change life’s circumstances—such as 
marriage, divorce, or birth or adoption of a child76—may have a 
revocatory effect upon a will by operation of law. However, the events 
or circumstances that constitute a revocation are not universal. For 
instance, some states call for revocation upon the testator’s marriage 
subsequent to execution77 while others do not.78 Similarly, while 
nearly every state calls for revocation upon the subsequent divorce of 
the testator,79 at least one might not.80 As “these forms of revocation 
involve matters of primary concern to the domicile,”81 domicile  
laws should generally govern. Therefore, because current  
framework mandates that situs law determines “whether particular 
                                                                                                                  
hand, requires only an intent to cancel in toto. See In re Barrie’s Will, 65 N.E.2d at 436; 
Presbyterian Church, 23 N.E.2d at 732. 
 71.  In re Barrie’s Estate, 35 N.W.2d at 663.    
 72.  Hancock, supra note 1, at 3.  
 73.  Id.
 74.  Id.
 75.  See id. at 3-4.  
 76.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-610 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Legis. Sess.); 
MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-105 (LexisNexis 2001); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2507  
(West 1975).  
 77.  See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.110 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-5-9 (1995).  
 78.  See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-508 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of the 2d 
Legis. Sess. 2012); FLA. STAT. § 732.507 (2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.090 (LexisNexis 
1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.37 (West, Westlaw through 2012 File 74 of the 2011-
2012 Legis. Sess.).  
 79.  See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-508 (1969); FLA. STAT. § 732.507(2) (2011).   
 80.  In Mississippi, a divorce does not automatically work a revocation by operation  
of law. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-3 (West 1999); Hinders v. Hinders, 828 So. 2d 1235, 
1238-45 (Miss. 2002). But it may constitute a revocation implied at law depending on  
the circumstances. See Rasco v. Estate of Rasco, 501 So. 2d 421, 423-24 (Miss. 1987); 
McKnight v. McKnight, 267 So. 2d 315, 316-17 (Miss. 1972). 
 81.  HAY, supra note 2, at 1296.   
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circumstances or events will have a revocatory effect upon [a] will,”82
testamentary expectations are threatened.   
 In In re Estate of Lans,83 the decedent was a New York 
domiciliary. Prior to his death, he obtained a divorce from his wife in 
Florida.84 Under Florida law, a divorce procured subsequent to 
execution of a will nullifies any testamentary benefit to the surviving 
party to the divorce.85 Nonetheless, when his will was admitted into a 
New York court for administration, his ex-wife sought an interest in 
his estate as a named beneficiary to his will.86 Ignoring the policy 
considerations at hand, the New York court applied New York law in 
determining whether the ex-wife was a beneficiary under the will.87
At the time, a divorce did not operate as a revocation under New 
York law.88 The New York court consequently found that the ex-wife 
was a proper party to the proceeding and could recover under  
the will.89
 In applying situs law to this revocation determination, the New 
York court upset the expectations of all parties involved. As 
explained by Professor Hay: 
In determining an appropriate property settlement on divorce, the 
parties and the courts will naturally consider the law of the state 
of the current domicile as the background for their conclusions. A 
statute of that state revoking a testamentary provision in favor of 
the former spouse is a guard against an unintended double 
portion. Upon a subsequent change of domicile prior to death, for a 
court to apply a governing law other than the domicile at time of 
the divorce may permit a double portion contrary to the 
expectation of all parties to the divorce . . . .90
 Thus, Florida law should have governed New York’s 
determination. Even if done so implicitly, the ex-wife received her 
portion of the estate when Florida law was applied to the prior 
divorce proceedings. As New York law had no interest in guarding 
 82.  Annotation, Conflict of Laws Respecting Revocation of Will, 9 A.L.R.2d 1412,  
1424 (1950).   
 83.  210 N.Y.S.2d 611 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1960). In re Estate of Lans deals with personal 
property, but is nonetheless demonstrative of how the desire to apply situs law may lead to  
unintended results.  
 84.  Id. at 612.   
 85.  Id. at 613; see also FLA. STAT. § 732.507(2) (2011).   
 86.  In re Estate of Lans, 210 N.Y.S.2d at 612.  
 87.  Id. at 613-16.  
 88.  See id. at 613. New York law now mandates revocation upon a divorce subsequent 
to revocation. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.4 (McKinney 2008).  Nonetheless, 
In re Estate of Lans is still probative of the ill effects of the situs default upon 
determinations of revocation by operation of law in general. There are still differences  
in other operation of law regimes (besides divorce). See supra notes 76-78 and  
accompanying text.  
 89.  In re Estate of Lans, 210 N.Y.S.2d at 616.   
 90.  HAY, supra note 2, at 1306.   
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against an “unintended double portion,”91 applying New York  
law worked an “injustice by frustrating the clear expectations of  
[the] testator.”92   
 In In re Estate of Wimbush,93 the decedent died domiciled in 
Hawaii but owning real property in Colorado. A Hawaiian court 
found that the decedent died intestate because his “marriage to his 
wife subsequent to [his] will’s execution revoked [his] will by 
operation of law” under Hawaiian law.94 The decedent’s wife then 
petitioned for an adjudication of the decedent’s intestacy in a 
Colorado ancillary proceeding.95 Because the Hawaiian proceeding 
lacked serious due process concerns, the Colorado court correctly 
rejected the Hawaiian decree under the principles set forth in 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.96 However, the 
Colorado court applied its own laws as to revocation.97 Since a 
marriage subsequent to execution does not operate as a revocation 
under Colorado law, the Colorado court ruled that the decedent died 
testate and that his will governed the devolution of real property 
situated in Colorado.98        
 The Colorado court recognized that always applying situs law may 
undermine “the policy of promoting [the] decedent’s expectations.”99
Nevertheless, the court found that deviation from the situs default 
should be limited to only “unusual circumstances.”100 As In re Estate 
of Wimbush shows, it is precisely this rigidity that leads to inequity.  
 Laws that revoke a will upon marriage operate “as a family 
protection device.”101 As a testator is usually domiciled in the same 
state as his or her family, it is “the domiciliary [that] normally has 
the dominant interest.”102 Indeed, 
Colorado had no legitimate interest that justified applying its laws 
to determine the validity of the will or the intestate shares of the 
decedent’s heirs. None of the parties in interest resided in 
 91.  Id.
 92.  In re Estate of Garver, 343 A.2d 817, 819 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) 
(concluding divorce is a “special circumstance[]” requiring deviation from common law).    
 93.  Wimbush v. Wimbush (In re Estate of Wimbush). 587 P.2d 796, 797 (Colo.  
App. 1978).  
 94.  Id.
 95.  Id.
 96.  339 U.S. 306 (1950). For support that Colorado correctly rejected the Hawaiian 
decree for lack of due process, see Alden, supra note 30, at 617.  
 97.  In re Estate of Wimbush, 587 P.2d at 799.  
 98.  Id.; see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-508 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1 of 
the 2d Legis. Sess. 2012).   
 99.  In re Estate of Wimbush, 587 P.2d at 799.  
 100.  Id. The Colorado court found that no such “unusual circumstances” were present 
in In re Estate of Wimbush. Id. (finding a lack of “unusual circumstances or predomination 
of contacts in Hawaii that would justify deviation from the favored lex sitae.”).   
 101.  HAY, supra note 2, at 1306.  
 102.  Id.
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Colorado, and no land policy of the situs was protected by the 
Colorado laws on will validation or intestacy.103
B.   Situs Default Imposes Undue Transaction Costs—Exacerbated  
by Uncertainty 
 At a minimum, the situs default forces the revoking testator to 
comply with the laws of each state in which real property is owned.104
The costs associated with this inconvenience may be exacerbated by 
uncertainty.105 For instance, the validity of a revocation pro tanto is 
uncertain to the extent a testator may acquire new realty in another 
state in the future.106 If the laws of that state differ from those taken 
into account during the revocation process, the transaction costs 
incurred will be for nothing.   
C.   Full Faith and Credit 
 It is well settled that “wills probated in the state of domicile 
relating to real property in another are not entitled to the protection 
of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution.”107
However, regardless of whether this is a sound principle of 
constitutional law,108 it does not mandate the situs to disrespect the 
judgments of its sister states.109 Indeed, “there seems no reason why 
 103.  Alden, supra note 30, at 617.  
 104.  The inconveniences in making devolutions of real property, in and of themselves, 
should also be noted. “The inconvenience is greater than an inter vivos transfer because 
land scattered in several states can be deeded by separate instruments, while the will is 
generally but a single instrument.” HAY, supra note 2, at 1295.    
 105.  It is also worth noting that reducing “uncertainty of title” is one of the reasons 
validation choice-of-law statutes were enacted. Recent Decisions, supra note 31, at 642; see
also In re Estate of Wimbush, 587 P.2d at 799. Thus, as revocation and execution are 
linked, the existence of uncertainty in the realm of revocation undermines legislative 
intent. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 106.  Some states do not allow partial revocation. See, e.g., supra note 62.       
 107.  Recent Decisions, supra note 31, at 642; see also Phillips v. Phillips, 104 So. 234, 
236 (Ala. 1925) (stating that it is the situs’ “right” to govern wills to lands); Trotter v. Van 
Pelt, 198 So. 215, 217 (Fla. 1940) (finding that foreign decrees “establish nothing beyond 
the limit of the State where the probate took place”); Stein v. Welch (In re Estate of Stein), 
896 P.2d 740, 745 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he state in which real property is located is 
not required to give full faith and credit to a decision of another state regarding probate of 
such real property.”). 
 108.  Though routine, failing to extend full faith and credit to nonsitus decrees affecting 
realty is nevertheless questionable. See Weintraub, supra note 22, at 10-16. Surely a 
nonsitus state is equally qualified to satisfy due process requirements. Alden, supra note 
30, at 595. “Moreover, it is simply not true that the non-situs forum is always an extremely 
inappropriate forum to adjudicate the interests in realty of persons before it.” Weintraub, 
supra note 22, at 15. This is especially so in the face of the illogical justifications 
traditionally set forth. For instance, “it is circular to talk in terms of full faith and credit 
not being owed to non-situs decrees affecting interests in land because the decreeing court 
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. If full faith and credit were required, the non-situs court 
would have subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. at 12 (emphasis added).  
 109.  See Weintraub, supra note 22, at 11. 
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the situs should not, [at least in appropriate cases], sustain the 
[expressions] of the testator by the law of his domicile.”110 The 
“exercise of jurisdiction by the nonsitus court satisfies due process 
and ‘pose[s] no real threat to the legitimate interest of the situs 
state.’ ”111 Moreover, in regards to revocation decrees, refusing to  
give full faith and credit is inconsistent with most validation  
statutes establishing a policy of acquiescence for the formalities of  
sister states.112   
 Nevertheless, situs states consistently refuse to bless foreign 
probate decrees with full faith and credit.113 Often, therefore, the 
situs default “forces litigants to go to court in more than one state.”114
This separation of litigation imposes unnecessary transaction costs 
on administration. It may also lead to “unreprovable fraud and 
abuse. It enables and encourages a party to submit to litigation in a 
nonsitus jurisdiction and later collaterally attack an unfavorable 
judgment at the situs.”115
 The situs default is thus “inefficient,”116 but is also superfluous as 
applied to revocation. There are no legitimate situs interests that 
justify always applying situs law.117 But even if there were, surely 
they would be furthered only when foreign law differs from situs  
law. However, even when domiciliary and situs laws are the same, 
the situs default leaves open the possibility for collateral attack in  
the situs.   
 110.  HAY, supra note 2, at 1294.  
 111.  Alden, supra note 30, at 609 (quoting Brainerd Currie, Full Faith and Credit to 
Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 620, 629 (1954)) (alteration in original).   
 112.  See Gailey v. Brown (In re Gailey’s Will), 171 N.W. 945, 947 (Wis. 1919).  
 113.  See, e.g., Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186, 192 (1900) (holding that a decision by the 
courts of the domicile of a testatrix that her will worked a conversion into personalty of all 
her real property, wherever situated, is not conclusive upon the courts of a sister state in 
respect to the effect of the will upon the title to real property in that estate); Baird v. 
Larson (In re Estate of Swanson), 397 So. 2d 465, 466 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (holding “that 
appellants have the right to attack [a] Georgia will in a Florida court, on substantive 
grounds, based on their interest in . . . real property located in Florida”); First Presbyterian 
Church of Sterling, Ill. v. Hodge (In re Barrie’s Estate), 35 N.W.2d 658, 661 (Iowa 1949) 
(“[F]ull faith and credit . . . does not render foreign decrees of probate conclusive as to the 
validity of a will, as respects real property situated in a state other than the one in which 
the decree was rendered, nor does the doctrine of res adjudicate or estoppel by judgment 
apply.”); Marr v. Hendrix, 952 S.W.2d 693, 695 (Ky. 1997) (“To permit a contest of a foreign 
will in another state, where the real estate affected by the will is located, does  
not violate full faith and credit required under the Federal Constitution.” (internal  
quotations omitted)).  
 114.  Alden, supra note 30, at 608.  
 115. Id. But see Cuevas v. Kelly, 873 So. 2d 367, 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that 
res judicata bars—via full faith and credit—collateral attack on domiciliary determinations 
with respect to individuals who were parties to the previous action or received adequate  
notice thereof).  
 116.  Alden, supra note 30, at 607.  
 117.  See infra Part III.B.  
1120 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1105
III.   THE BURDENS IMPOSED BY THE SITUS DEFAULT ARE
WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION
 As we have seen, the situs default imposes burdens upon the 
revoking testator. It threatens his expectations and imposes 
unnecessary transaction costs upon estate administration. Now 
comes the gravamen for abandonment: there is no reason for the 
situs default to exist. Its existence is both illogical and unjustified.        
A.   Choice-of-Law Validation Statutes Should  
Accommodate Revocation 
 As previously stated, modern validation statutes have alleviated 
common law execution concerns, but have not shielded issues of 
revocation from inconsistent outcomes or inconveniences. But there is 
no reason they should not. That most refer only to execution is 
irrelevant: execution and revocation are inextricably linked. 
Excluding revocation is thus an illogical statutory construction 
premised on archaic distinctions.   
 1.   Textualism Is Not the Proper Construction: Execution and 
Revocation Are Clearly Linked 
 Modern validation statutes are commonly interpreted narrowly, 
limiting common law deviation to instances of express authorization 
and leaving the situs default intact as applied to revocation.118 For 
example, in In re Barrie’s Estate, the testatrix’s will was executed 
and subsequently revoked pursuant to the laws of her Illinois 
domicile.119 The court found that the Iowa validation statute—which 
gave effect to a foreign will if executed in compliance with the laws of 
the decedent’s domicile or state of execution—validated her will for 
purposes of probate in Iowa.120 However, the court failed to also 
accommodate her revocation under this statute even though the 
revocation was valid pursuant to the same laws that gave her will 
force in Iowa in the first instance.121 In reaching this result, the court 
narrowly interpreted Iowa’s validation statute, stating that the
statute “is clearly a modification of the common law and should not be 
extended to include matters not clearly included therein. It 
 118. See Wimbush v. Wimbush (In re Estate of Wimbush), 587 P.2d 796, 798-99 (Colo. 
App. 1978); In re Barrie’s Estate, 35 N.W.2d 658, 663 (Iowa 1949); Prestie v. Prestie (In re
Estate of Prestie), 138 P.3d 520, 523 (Nev. 2006) (“ ‘Statutes governing the revocation of 
wills are strictly construed.’ ” (quoting Todora v. Todora, 554 P.2d 738 (Nev. 1976))); In re
Estate of Lans, 210 N.Y.S.2d 611, 613 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1960); Thomas v. Taylor, No. 
C-000624, 2001 WL 992086 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2001); SCHOENBLUM, supra note 3, at 
14-26. But see In re Traversi’s Estate, 64 N.Y.S. 2d 453 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1946).  
 119.  In re Barrie’s Estate, 35 N.W.2d at 660. 
 120.  Id.
 121.  See id. at 660-63.  
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specifically deals with the formalities in the execution of the will, and 
nothing more.”122 But such textualism is illogical. “[N]o rational 
distinction can be drawn, in this context, between rules prescribing 
the mode of making wills and those prescribing the mode of  
revoking them. Both types of rules serve the same purpose: the 
establishment of techniques by which a testator can communicate his 
wishes to the judge.”123
 Even more fundamental, in order for the situs to declare a foreign 
will valid, the testator has to actually have a valid foreign will!124
“[S]ince a will is ambulatory until death, a determination of whether 
it has or has not been revoked is essential to a decision regarding its 
admission to probate.”125 Indeed, revocation is     
merely the converse of execution. The power to execute implies the 
power to revoke. A will can no longer be said to be executed after it 
has been revoked. Whether an instrument is a will is determined 
not only by the manner of its execution but also by the manner  
of its attempted revocation. Both acts are a part of the  
testamentary process.126
 Furthermore, a narrow interpretation simply does not coincide 
with the legislative motivations underlying the enactment of 
validation statutes. It undermines a clear purpose for their 
enactment—to ease the testator’s burden.127 It is also inconsistent 
with the statutes’ acquiescence for equally significant formality 
requirements. Given the clear connection between execution and 
revocation, it would be “unthinkable that [a] legislature intended to 
require recognition of the laws of another jurisdiction in the matter of 
one and not of the other.”128 Best argued by Professor Hancock:  
It would [be] absurd for the lawmaker to say (in effect) to the 
foreign testator, ‘For your convenience we shall recognize your will 
as valid if made in compliance with our law, the law of your 
 122.  Id. at 663.   
 123.  Hancock, supra note 1, at 6-7.  
 124.  See In re Barrie’s Estate, 35 N.W.2d at 665 (Smith, J., dissenting) (stating that 
Iowa’s validation statute is “valid in ascertaining what effect is to be given the instrument 
once it has been found to be a will. . . . Before that question is reached[, however,] it must 
first be established that it is in fact the will of [the testator].”); Gailey v. Brown (In re
Gailey’s Will), 171 N.W. 945, 947 (Wisc. 1919) (stating that it is first necessary to 
determine “whether or not [the] testator made a valid will, and, if so, whether it [has] been 
legally revoked before his death”).   
 125. Recent Decisions, supra note 31, at 643; see also In re Culley’s Will, 48 N.Y.S.2d 
216, 225 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1944) (“[I]f a will is ambulatory for one purpose, it should be for  
all purposes.”).  
 126.  In re Barrie’s Estate, 35 N.W.2d at 666-67 (Smith, J., dissenting).  
 127.  “The motivation for looking beyond situs law has been the sensible attitude that a 
testator should not be required, each time he acquires real property in another foreign 
jurisdiction, to execute a will in order to comply with minor technical formalities of the 
situs’ wills law.” SCHOENBLUM, supra note 3, at 14-4.       
 128.  In re Barrie’s Estate, 35 N.W.2d at 667 (Smith, J., dissenting).  
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domicile, or the law of the place of making. But if you decide  
to revoke that will you can only do so in the mode prescribed by  
our law.’129
 A few courts have recognized this disconnect between textualism 
and legislative intent. In In re Traversi’s Estate,130 the testator 
executed a will while domiciled in New York. He subsequently moved 
to, and became domiciled in, Virginia.131 While in Virginia, he 
attempted to partially revoke his will.132 This was evidenced by lines 
drawn through separate paragraphs of typewritten matter.133
Further, “in the margin opposite such obliterated paragraph[s was] a 
notation in the writing of [the] deceased saying: ‘Cancelled 
A. G. T.’ ”134 On the day the decedent carried out these acts, they 
constituted a partial revocation under Virginia law.135 Subsequent to 
these acts, the decedent reestablished his domicile in New York, 
where he ultimately died.136 Upon his death, his will was admitted 
into probate in a New York court. It was clear that the acts of the 
decedent were “wholly ineffectual under New York law” to 
accomplish a partial revocation.137 Nonetheless, the court found that 
the will was partially revoked vis-à-vis Virginia law.138
 At the time, New York’s validation statute directed admission into 
probate of a foreign will “if the execution followed the mode 
prescribed in the place where [it was] executed or where the testator 
was domiciled.”139 The court recognized that the policy underlying 
this statute was one of effectuating testamentary intent,140 and 
reasoned that it would undermine this policy to effectuate execution 
but not revocation:   
Our statutes say that a will must be admitted to probate here if 
executed with the formalities required by the law of the testator’s 
domicile. [If] a testator after executing such a will thereafter 
partially revokes it by an act which operates under the law of his 
then domicile as an immediate partial revocation our courts cannot 
say that they will recognize the first testamentary act and refuse 
 129.  Hancock, supra note 1, at 7.  
 130.  64 N.Y.S.2d 453, 455 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1946).  
 131. Id.
 132.  Id. at 455-56.  
 133.  Id. at 455.  
 134.  Id.
 135.  SCHOENBLUM, supra note 3, at 14-26 to -27.  
 136.  In re Traversi’s Estate, 64 N.Y.S.2d at 455.  
 137.  Id. at 456.  
 138.  Id. at 459-60.  
 139.  Id. at 456.  
 140.  Id. at 459 (validation statute requires court to “validate [a] testamentary plan”); 
see also SCHOENBLUM, supra note 3, at 14-27. 
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to give effect to the second one. Neither logic nor reason would 
support such a policy.141
 Similarly, in In re Gailey’s Will, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
reasoned that the “necessary result of these statutes . . . is that the 
primary inquiry of determining as to the form and mode of the 
execution of foreign wills devising real estate . . . and the lawful 
power of the testator to make such a will is committed to [a foreign 
state].”142 And this inquiry necessarily includes whether a will is 
valid under foreign law, and, if so, whether it has been revoked under  
the same.143
 As these two cases show, including only the actual formalities of 
execution within the word “execution” is too narrow an 
interpretation.144 “If full effect is to be given to [validation statutes], 
the word ‘execution’ should be interpreted to encompass all questions 
concerned with the validity of the will and not merely those 
concerned with its execution.”145
 2.   Textualism Inappropriately Premised on “Ancient Distinctions” 
 Failing to include revocation under modern validation statutes is 
also unsound because it is premised on outdated distinctions between 
real and personal property. Specifically, forcing situs law upon only 
immovables is misplaced. The origin for evoking domiciliary law for 
determinations regarding movables  
has as its bases tradition and ideas of policy or expediency. 
Originally, on the continent of Europe and in England movables 
were said to follow the person of the owner so that both 
transactions inter vivos and matters of succession were generally 
stated to be governed by the domiciliary law. The fiction of 
domiciliary situs is apt to coincide with actual situs in a society 
with limited economy since in such a society a person’s chattels are 
likely to be located at the place where he lives.146
But this rationale no longer holds firm in our society of increased 
economy and mobility.147 Some people, if not most, will at some point 
 141.  In re Traversi’s Estate, 64 N.Y.S.2d at 459. Compare id., with First Presbyterian 
Church of Sterling, Ill. v. Hodge (In re Barrie’s Estate), 35 N.W.2d 658, 660-63 (Iowa 1949) 
(declining to apply the revocation laws of a foreign state).  
 142. 171 N.W. 945, 947 (Wis. 1919). 
 143.  Id.
 144.  Recent Decisions, supra note 31, at 643. 
 145.  Id.; see also In re Barrie’s Estate, 35 N.W.2d at 668 (Smith, J., dissenting) (finding 
that because a will is ambulatory until death, “anything done to the instrument by the 
testator affecting its status as a will is to be considered in determining whether [the 
testator] has finally executed it”).  
 146.  Stumberg, supra note 7, at 29.   
 147.  See id.
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move away from their domiciliary jurisdiction148 leaving behind 
personal property—including intangible property, which could be 
located anywhere.149 Nevertheless, such a move still empowers the 
testator’s new domiciliary with jurisdiction over foreign property.  
 After such misplaced acquiescence, it is unfounded to claim 
exclusive entitlement to determinations affecting only realty. 
“Whatever the form of property, the same formalities for executing 
and revoking are required [by the situs].”150 And under modern 
validation statutes, the situs will recognize the validity of a foreign 
will probated or executed pursuant to the laws of a foreign state, 
regardless of whether real or personal property is affected.151
Adhering to the “ancient distinction[s]” between immovables and 
movables “overlook[s] the profound effect of modern probate statutes 
that have entirely eliminated any old differences in formal 
requirements and solemnities as to mode of execution (and 
revocation) and probate procedure between ‘wills of personalty’ and 
‘wills of realty,’ as they were formally referred to.”152
 Apart from being a mere continuance of an archaic distinction, it 
has also been claimed that it is simply the “inherent right of every 
sovereign state, for its own security and in keeping with its dignity 
and independence, to regulate the alienation, devise, [and] descent of 
real estate within its borders.”153 But this is also unpersuasive to 
justify the distinction. “The same could be said about all property, 
both movable and immovable, and yet those who jealously guard a 
state’s control over real property within its borders do not assert that 
such exclusive control must be maintained over personal property, or  
even persons.”154
B.   The Situs Default Fails to Further the State Interests Purportedly 
Justifying its Existence 
 “Neither logic nor reason” supports a policy giving effect to 
execution but not revocation.155 This becomes clearer when married to 
an additional submission: it is simply not true that situs law must 
always be applied to revocations in order to protect legitimate state 
 148.  Perhaps everyone will move to Florida? “Due to the attractiveness of life in Florida 
to both retirees and nonretirees, Florida’s population is increasing at a rapid rate.” Baird v. 
Larson (In re Estate of Swanson), 397 So. 2d 465, 467 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).  
 149.  In re Barrie’s Estate, 35 N.W.2d 658, 667 (Iowa 1949) (Smith, J., dissenting) 
(“Foreign ownership of property has become common.”).  
 150.  Id. at 665.   
 151.  Id.
 152.  Id. at 664.  
 153.  Phillips v. Phillips, 104 So. 234, 236 (Ala. 1925).  
 154.  Alden, supra note 30, at 594.  
 155.  In re Traversi’s Estate, 64 N.Y.S.2d 453, 459 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1946).  
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interests.156 Significantly, the situs has no legitimate interest in 
safeguarding noncitizens against fraud.157 Applying situs revocation 
formalities—the purpose of which is to protect intent by safeguarding 
against fraud—thus fails to further the state interests they were 
designed to protect.158 The situs only has an interest in protecting its 
own citizens; extension to noncitizens is “misplaced paternalism.”159
 Other justifications for the strict application of situs law are 
similarly mislaid.160 For instance, one time-honored justification 
states that application of situs law is appropriate because the situs 
has an interest in protecting the integrity and effectiveness of its title 
recording systems.161 But revocation and title accuracy are distinct! 
Not applying situs law to revocation determinations in no way 
prevents the situs “from applying its law to protect bona fide 
purchasers, just as the situs state would in a purely domestic 
transaction.”162 Application of foreign law informs only who receives
the situs’ realty, not how it will be recorded upon devolution. 
Consequently, applying foreign law “will not lead to inconvenience or 
result in the insecurity of land titles.”163 Title searchers may still 
consult only situs law with respect to this issue.164
 Of course, there are some situations in which application of situs 
law would further legitimate state interests.165 For instance, the situs 
has a legitimate interest in ensuring the proper use and free 
circulation of its land.166 It may also have a legitimate interest in 
protecting its creditors.167 However, having a more “dominant 
interest”168 in some situations does not justify applying situs law to 
every situation. Even in the rare instances in which situs interests 
 156.  See Weintraub, supra note 22, at 28.  
 157.  Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Multijurisdictional Estates and Article II of the Uniform 
Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1291, 1297 n.29 (1992). 
 158.  See Weintraub, supra note 22, at 28.   
 159.  Id. Moreover, modern validation statutes do not protect against fraud in the 
execution. This is additional evidence of a lack of a legitimate interest in protecting 
noncitizens against fraud. If the situs’ interests were truly legitimate, why would the 
legislature forgo an opportunity to further it? And even if an interest did exist, surely it is 
no more legitimate in the realm of revocation than execution.  
 160. For further discussion on the faulty presumptions upon which the traditional 
justifications in support of the lex situs are premised, see Alden, supra note 30, at 591-98.   
 161.  See id. at 592; see also Wimbush v. Wimbush (In re Estate of Wimbush), 587 P.2d 
796, 799 (Colo. App. 1978); Olson v. Weber, 187 N.W. 465, 467 (Iowa 1922); Marr v. 
Hendrix, 952 S.W.2d 693, 695 (Ky. 1997); In re Estate of Janney, 446 A.2d 1265, 1266 (Pa. 
1982); In re Estate of Briggs, 134 S.E.2d 737, 740 (W. Va. 1964); Weintraub, supra note 22,  
at 3-5.   
 162.  Alden, supra note 30, at 592; see also Weintraub, supra note 22, at 11.   
 163.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 239 cmt. e (1971).   
 164.  See id.
 165.  See id. at cmts. b, f.  
 166.  See id.; see also Alden, supra note 30, at 595-96.  
 167.  E.g., Prestie v. Prestie (In re Estate of Prestie), 138 P.3d 520, 523 (Nev. 2006).   
 168.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 239 cmt. b (1971).   
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are dominant, it will be “at least debatable” whether they sufficiently 
outweigh the “very great national need” for honoring the expectations 
of sister states.169 This is particularly true when the conflict is 
between differing revocation laws. As stated earlier, some revocation 
laws may operate as a “family protection device,” of which the 
domicile normally has the dominant interest.170 Therefore,  
situs interests are better protected “through a disciplined, 
jurisprudentially sound approach of interest analysis and not 
through the rote recitation of an inflexible ‘rule.’ ”171
IV.   FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
 The situs default should not be used to determine whether a 
foreign will has been revoked. Instead of rigid application of situs 
law, the situs should balance its own interests against those of 
interested foreign states as well as the ascertainable expectations172
of the revoking testator.173 Under this functional approach, intent to 
revoke should be given effect if the testator has satisfied the formal 
requirements of the state which is most interested in the 
transaction.174 To some extent, this approach has been advanced by 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws:
The courts of the situs [will] usually apply their own local law in 
deciding [issues of revocation]. Sometimes, however, these courts 
would apply the local law of another state. . . . [This may be] on the 
ground that the concern of that state in the decision of the particular 
issue is so great as to outweigh the values of certainty and 
convenience which application of their own law would achieve.175
 169.  Weintraub, supra note 22, at 11.   
 170.  HAY, supra note 2, at 1306. But see In re Estate of Garver, 343 A.2d 817, 819 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).        
 171.  Alden, supra note 30, at 596. This principle is a motivating factor upon which a 
functional approach is urged. See infra Part IV.  
 172.  As we have seen, the testator’s justifiable expectations are tied to the law of the 
predominantly interested state. See supra Part II.A.1.  
 173.  Public policy issues should also be balanced. “The traditional test used to 
determine whether the public policy of the forum prevents the application of [the situs 
default] is whether application of the foreign law will violate some fundamental principle of 
justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the 
commonweal.” Buresh v. First Nat’l Bank (In re Estate of Seman), 500 P.2d 1063, 1065-66 
(Or. Ct. App. 1972).   
 174.  Note, supra note 26, at 359. See generally Weintraub, supra note 22.   
 175.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 239 cmt. i (1971). However, this 
approach is only quasi-functional because situs law is still the default. Nonsitus law is 
applied only “sometimes.” Id. As we have seen, such an approach has caused 
inconsistencies. Compare Wimbush v. Wimbush (In re Estate of Wimbush), 587 P.2d 796, 
799 (Colo. App. 1978) (deviating only under “unusual circumstances”), with In re Estate of 
Janney, 446 A.2d 1265, 1266 (Pa. 1982) (finding situs formalism is sound, but not applying 
situs law to further clear expectations).   
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 In balancing the interests, however, those of the situs will almost 
never be dominant in revocation determinations.176 Indeed, once the 
“false dogmas” of the situs default are “consigned to the bonfire, it 
becomes apparent that proper solution of the choice-of-law problem 
will rarely, if ever, result in the application of the law of the 
situs . . . .”177 At least to some extent, this has also been recognized by 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws:
[W]here a testator, domiciled in state X, owns land in state Y and 
where under X local law a will is revoked by subsequent marriage 
or divorce. . . . [T]he Y courts might feel that X has the primary 
concern in determining whether a will has been revoked under 
such circumstances and that consequently X local law should  
be applied. 178
Moreover, a functional approach will not unduly burden the situs. 
As we have seen, the situs default fails to further the interests 
purported for its existence.179
V. CONCLUSION
 Application of the common law situs rule to revocation 
determinations imposes undue burdens upon the revoking testator 
owning realty beyond domiciliary borders. These burdens are 
unfounded in reason, lack legitimate justification, and accommodate 
the very harms legislation intended to cure. As a consequence, the 
situs default should be abandoned. In its place, a functional approach 
should serve as the starting point for choice-of-law determinations. 
This approach will more likely coincide with testamentary 
expectations while leaving legitimate situs interests unscathed. 
 176. Weintraub, supra note 22, at 16.  
 177. Id.
 178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 239 cmt. i (1971); see also In re
Estate of Garver, 343 A.2d 817, 819 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).        
 179. See supra Part III.B. 
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